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Abstract
This paper examines the impact of ownership structure on executive compensation in
China’s listed firms. We find that the cash flow rights of ultimate controlling
shareholders have a positive effect on the pay-performance relationship, while a
divergence between control rights and cash flow rights has a significantly negative
effect on the pay-performance relationship. We divide our sample based on ultimate
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management bureaus (SAMB), and privately controlled firms. We find that in SOE
controlled firms cash flow rights have a significant impact on accounting based
pay-performance relationship. In privately controlled firms, cash flow rights affect the
market based pay-performance relationship. In SAMB controlled firms, CEO pay
bears no relationship with either accounting or market based performance. The
evidence suggests that CEO pay is inefficient in firms where the state is the
controlling shareholder because it is insensitive to market based performance
but consistent with the efforts of controlling shareholders to maximize their private
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Disproportional ownership structure and pay-performance
relationship: evidence from China’s listed firms
1. Introduction
In recent years two strands of research on the effect of ownership structure on
pay-performance relationships have begun to emerge. The first focuses on the effects
of cash flow rights and divergence between control rights and cash flow rights (excess
control rights) on CEO pay (Masulis et al., 2009; Barontini and Bozzi, 2010). With
US dual-class firms, Masulis et al. (2009) find that the divergence between an
insider’s control and cash flow rights has a positive effect on CEO pay, while from a
sample of Italian listed firms, Barontini and Bozzi (2010) acknowledged that there is a
negative effect. The second strand focuses on the effects of an ultimate controlling
shareholder’s type on the pay-performance relationship, particularly between state and
non-state owned firms in transition economies such as China. For example, Kato and
Long (2005) find that state ownership weakened the pay-performance relationship.
Firth et al. (2006) find that distinct types of controlling shareholders have different
impacts on the use of incentive pay for CEOs, and they provide evidence that CEO
pay is weakly related to firm performance in firms whose controlling shareholder is
either the central government or a private owner. We extend their research by
explicitly examining how a controlling shareholder’s type, cash flow rights and excess
control rights shape CEO pay and the pay-performance relationship.
Several studies find that the wedge between cash flow and control rights affects
firm value (Cleassens et al., 2002; Lemmon and Lins, 2003; Laeven and Levine, 2008;
Gompers et al., 2010). Indeed through a common practice of ownership concentration
and pyramid structure, controlling shareholders in emerging markets can exercise
control through voting rights despite having relatively small proportional cash flow
rights. This excess control rights gives controlling shareholders an incentive to
expropriate the wealth of other investors and pursue their own interests, which are
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often diametrically opposed to those of minority shareholders (Chen et al., 2011). The
issues regarding the expropriation of minority shareholders are especially relevant in
economies with weak legal protection or poorer governance standards (La Porta et al.,
1999, 2000; Johnson et al. 2000; Peng et al., 2011). Conflicts between the largest
shareholders and minority shareholders are particularly severe in transition economies
where the ownership is highly concentrated and investors lack legal protection
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Lin et al., 2010). The general consensus is that a
disproportional ownership structure allows for easier expropriation of the wealth of
minority shareholders, which results in lower a firm’s value. Fan et al. (2011) further
suggest that the cost of expropriation may ultimately be born by the controlling
shareholders and that they would need to devote substantial resources to their
expropriation activities. However, the question of whether the controlling
shareholder’s excess control rights affects CEO pay remains unexplored in the context
of disproportional ownership economy. CEO compensation is essential to provide
management incentive, which is not necessarily consistent with the interest of
minority shareholders.
Aligning executive interests with those of shareholders is an important governance
mechanism (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). In economies with concentrated ownership,
the largest shareholders are often in charge of setting CEO compensations. The impact
of ownership concentration and excessive control on executive incentives remains
contradictory. Murphy (1999) suggested that the largest shareholders have strong
incentives to directly monitor managers by relating CEO pay to firm performance. On
the other hand, the separation of control and cash flow rights is able to adversely
affect the pay-performance relationship, since the largest shareholders extract their
private benefits by setting CEO compensation schemes unrelated to the wealth of
minority shareholders but to the controlling shareholder’s private interest. To help
understand these questions, we use the unique Chinese context1 to examine the effect
1

Firth et al. (2006) suggest that “China’s listed firms have unique ownership characteristics where the

largest shareholder usually has effective control. Most listed firms have a dominant shareholder that
helps shape the strategies and policies of the company. The dominant shareholder can exercise
3

of ownership structure, specifically cash flow rights and control rights of the ultimate
controlling shareholders, on the pay-performance relationship.
China’s economic transition follows a path of partial privatization, in which the
state retains control over many SOEs by floating only a small percentage of shares to
the public. It does this through creating a long principal-agent chain, a significant
pyramid structure, and cross-shareholdings of ownership. As a result, the state
controlling shareholders have substantial control rights in excess of their cash flow
rights. At the same time, many privately controlled firms were also listed in the capital
markets in China through initial public offerings (IPOs) along the development of
these Chinese markets after 2001.
State controlled and privately controlled firms have different operating objectives
due to the nature of their ownership and are also subject to different regulations. It is
argued that state controlled firms operate with multiple objectives that vary between
maximizing the wealth of shareholders, maintaining urban employment levels, and
controlling sensitive industries (Clarke, 2003). Fan et al. (2011) also argued that state
ownership, which is often non-tradable or not freely-transferrable, can have a
significant impact on managerial incentive schemes. Therefore, it is important to
distinguish between state and private-controlled firms because they may intend to use
different incentive schemes.
However, due to the complex ownership structure of state controlled firms, it is
also important to distinguish amongst state controlled firms. State controlling
shareholders may belong to different state owned entities and government agencies
and each of them may have different objectives and therefore desire to adopt different
pay schemes. Therefore we classified state controlled firms into two categories based
on their ultimate controlling shareholders: state assets management bureaus (SAMBs),
and state owned enterprises (SOEs). SAMB is a government agency responsible for
substantial control over a firm by way of board representation as well as through voting rights. In many
cases it is the State, local, city, or regional government that has the controlling share stake. In other cases,
the controlling shareholder is a SOE (from which the listed firm was carved out) or a private
blockholder.”
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managing and controlling state owned assets. In SAMB controlled firms, CEOs work
as representatives of the government, so their pay scheme may not be based purely on
economic performance. In contrast, the publicized goal for SOE controlled firms is to
maximize the firm’s value and incentivize management.
Historically, most general managers of state controlled firms worked as
bureaucrats and were paid according to the civil service pay scale. Since 1985, China
introduced wage reform and other economic reforms in state controlled firms to
improve the management compensation scheme. In 2000, the Ministry of Labor
announced that CEO payment in state controlled firms should be linked to a firm’s
economic performance (the Ministry of Labor, 2000). However, this did not provide
sufficient incentive as firms still operated under the previous system where profits and
wages were being redistributed by the state (Yueh, 2004). With the establishment of
two stock exchanges in the early 1990s and the State-Owned Assets Supervision and
Administration Commission of the State Council (SASAC) in 2003, many state
controlled firms were restructured and listed on the two stock exchanges. Since 2003,
many regulations have been promulgated by SASAC to evaluate SOE performance
and align this with CEO pay. Specifically, SASAC issued ‘Interim regulations on the
evaluation of the top executive operating performance’ in SOEs affiliated to the
central government (SOECGs) in 2003, which clearly stated that top executive pay
should be aligned to total profits and sales and described how to evaluate executive
performance2. In 2006 and 2010, SASAC updated this regulation by adding some
extra rules such as the punishment of top executives when they were underperforming.
Obviously, by putting these regulations into practice, SASAC has decreed that
profitability should be the primary measure of firm performance to which CEO pay
should be linked. Meanwhile, to curtail CEO’s from expropriating shareholder wealth
through excessive perks, SASAC also promulgated ‘Instructions on regulating top

2

Furthermore, in 2007 and 2008, the SASAC announced two ‘supplementary provisions’ of this regulation which
made further efforts on aligning executive pay to firm performance in SOEs. Meanwhile, in 2004, 2006 and 2009,
the SASAC also promulgated the ‘Interim regulations on the administration of top executive pay in SOECGs’,
‘Interim regulations on the evaluation and administration of SOECG performance’ and ‘Interim regulations on the
evaluation and administration of state owned financial institutions firm performance’.
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executive ‘on-job’ consumptions in SOECGs’ in 20063.
These reforms and regulations of executive compensation in SOE controlled firms
are largely aimed at aligning the interests of shareholders and management. Several
studies document a positive pay-performance relationship in both SOE and privately
controlled firms but not in SAMB controlled firms (Kato and Long, 2005; Firth et al.,
2006, 2007). These results confirmed that the goals of these reforms in SOE
controlled firms and CEO compensation have been achieved to some extent.
In China’s weak corporate governance environment, the largest shareholders have
strong incentives to monitor managers and operations as their concentrated cash flow
rights helps overcome the free ride problem. However, if control rights exceed cash
flow rights, controlling shareholders are likely to pursue their own interests and may
seek to expropriate minority investors by tunneling, related party sales, and
transferring profits out of the company for personal gains (Johnson et al., 2000; Fan et
al., 2011). Such conflicts of interest between the largest shareholders and minority
shareholders will hamper the application of performance based pay incentives (Wang
and Xiao, 2011). Therefore, the largest shareholders’ cash flow rights and excess
control rights may have conflicting effects on the pay-performance relationship. Our
first hypothesis states that:
•

H1a: Cash flow rights have a positive effect on pay-performance
relationship.

•

H1b: Excess control rights have a negative effect on pay-performance
relationship.

Many controlling shareholders of China’s listed firms are state-owned entities or
government agents, and state held shares are not tradable on the stock exchanges5. As
a result, state shareholders have an incentive to set CEO pay based on
accounting-linked performance indicators, since to maximize free cash flow, they
either receive cash remittance or can expropriate other investors that have more
3

At the local levels, the local SASACs located across the country have also issued regulations based on their local
specific characteristics according to the regulations from the central SASAC. For example, Beijing SASAC
promulgated ‘Interim regulations on the administration of top executive pay in Beijing SOEs’ in 2004, which has
similar effects of relating CEO pay to firm performance.
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resources available. Therefore, market based indicators such as stock return often
have no direct link to a controlling shareholder’s wealth. Accordingly, we argue that
state shareholders emphasize maximizing profits rather than shareholder value. In
contrast, since shares in privately controlled firms held by the largest shareholders can
be freely traded, private investors are more concerned about market performance.
Therefore, we formulate the following hypothesis:
•

H2a: Cash flow rights in state controlled firms have a positive effect on
accounting performance based pay-performance relationship, while cash
flow rights in non-state controlled firms have a positive effect on market
performance based pay-performance relationship.

•

H2b: Excess control rights in state controlled firms have a negative effect
on accounting performance based pay-performance relationship, while
excess control rights in non-state controlled firms have a negative effect on
market performance based pay-performance relationship.

In China under SASAC, SOE controlled firms are directly and ultimately
controlled by central and/or local governments. It is mandatory that state owners
receive cash flows, including profits and dividends, because shares of SOEs are often
not tradable unless approved by the CSRC and the selling price is only at book value
(Xu, 2003). Since 2003, CEOs of SOE controlled firms have been evaluated
according to a combination of annual performance measures such as return on assets
(ROA) and return on sales (ROS). We therefore hypothesize that:
•

H3a: Cash flow rights have a positive effect on accounting based
pay-performance relationship in SOE controlled firms.

•

H3b: Excess control rights have a negative effect on accounting based
pay-performance relationship in SOE controlled firms.

SAMBs4 are the state agencies that hold non-tradable shares on the market. They
do not have cash flow rights from these shares and payouts often have to be remitted
4

The term SAMB encompasses state asset management bureaus, state asset operating companies, and
state agencies like the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Agriculture. However, SAMBs, located
across provinces and cities, are merely agents of the central government that manage state-owned
assets and invest them in listed firms.
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directly to different levels of governments (Firth et al., 2006). The objectives of
SAMB controlled firms are to carry out the instructions of the central or local
governments and to maintain local employment levels rather than maximize the value
of a firm. In most instances CEOs in SAMB controlled firms are officials from the
government, with little or no professional background, no rights to select other top
executives, and no responsibility for economic consequences (Zhang, 1998). We
therefore hypothesize the following:
•

H4: Cash flow rights and excess control rights have no effect on
pay-performance relationship in SAMB controlled firms.

Our results indicate that CEO pay in SOE controlled firms is related to firm
accounting performance (return on assets and return on sales), while CEO pay in
privately controlled firms is related to market performance (stock return). However,
there is no relationship between CEO pay and firm performance in firms controlled by
SAMBs. Our regression results show that the cash flow rights of the largest
shareholders enhance accounting performance related pay schemes in SOE controlled
firms and improve market performance related pay schemes in privately controlled
firms. However, the separation between control rights and cash flow rights shows
negative entrenchment effects by significantly reducing the pay-performance
relationship in both SOE and privately controlled firms. We also find that cash flow
rights in SAMB controlled firms do not appear to affect the pay-performance
relationship, which confirms the consensus that these firms do not really have cash
flow rights because they must remit earnings back to their superiors (Firth et al.,
2006).
We have made two substantial contributions to the literature. First, our research
not only sheds light on how cash flow rights and excess control rights affect CEO pay,
it also submits new evidence on how cash flow rights and excess control rights affect
the pay-performance relationship. Cash flow rights have a positive incentive effect
on the pay-performance relationship while excess control rights have a negative
entrenchment effect. Second, our study furthers the understanding that different
performance based pay schemes are used between SOE controlled firms and privately
8

controlled firms. Cash flow rights and the divergence between control rights and cash
flow rights influence pay-performance relationship across firms with different types
of ultimate ownership. Our evidence suggests that CEO pay in firms with SOEs as the
controlling shareholders is determined by accounting based performance but is not
sensitive to market based firm performance. This is consistent with the private
benefits of controlling shareholders, as the CEO pay scheme aims to maximize
accounting performance in order to extract greater cash flows.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 reviews the relevant literature;
Section 3 outlines the data and methodology; Section 4 discusses the empirical results;
and Section 5 presents the conclusions.

2. Literature review
The separation of ownership and control by the largest shareholder has been
researched extensively. For example, La Porta et al. (1999) argued that the ultimate
controlling shareholders often use a pyramid structure and cross shareholding to
obtain control rights in excess of their cash flow rights. With a sample of 1,301
publicly traded corporations in eight East Asian countries at the end of 1996,
Claessens et al. (2002) provided important evidence that cash flow rights have a
positive incentive effect while the divergence between control and cash flow rights
has a negative entrenchment effect on corporate governance. Similar results were also
provided by Lemmon and Lins (2003), Laeven and Levine (2008) and Gompers et al.
(2010). Chen et al. (2011) further argued that the disproportional ownership can also
be due to political connections. By using a sample of 276 privately controlled firms
that listed in markets via IPO between 1993 and 2008, they found that politically
connected firms tended to maintain a significantly concentrated ownership control
structure. Moreover, Johnson et al. (2000) argued that managerial expropriation is an
important form of tunneling which lowers shareholder value, and Peng et al. (2011)
pointed out that connected transactions are an alternative to tunneling depending on
the different financial situations of firms. However, Fan et al. (2011), among others,
argued that disproportional ownership structure may not always result in
9

expropriation especially when controlling owners need to devote substantial resources
to carry out the expropriation. In this sense, they suggested that expropriation may not
be the sole reason for concentrated ownership structures in emerging markets.
Only recently have academics started to examine the effects of cash flow rights
and excess control rights on CEO pay. Specifically, Masulis et al. (2009) found a
positive relationship between excess control rights and CEO pay by using a sample of
189 U.S. dual-class firms that made acquisitions during the period between 1994 and
2002, while Barontini and Bozzi (2010) found evidence from a sample of Italian listed
firms that CEO pay was positively affected by a low divergence of control and cash
flow rights.
Recent studies also provided evidence of the effects of blockholder ownership on
pay-performance relationship. For example, John et al. (2010) examined an
association between outside blockholder ownership and pay-performance sensitivity,
by using a sample of 120 bank-holding companies from 1992 to 2000. They argued
that the pay-performance relationship was positively related to blockholder intensity.
A similar argument was echoed by Kim (2010), who suggested that the
pay-performance relationship was positively determined by blockholder ownership.
Several other studies examined whether the largest shareholder’s ownership affects
the pay-performance relationship. By using a sample of U.S. insurance companies
from 1994 to 1996, Ke et al. (1999) found that for public-held insurers, managerial
compensation and ROA were closely related.
China, as a transition economy, is an important and unique case study for
examining the effect that different ultimate controlling shareholders, particularly
between state and non-state owned firms, have on CEO pay and the pay-performance
relationship. For example, by using a sample of China’s listed firms between 1998
and 2002, Kato and Long (2005) found that the pay-performance relationship was
weaker in state owned firms, thus making them less effective in solving agency
problems. With a sample of China’s listed firms between 1998 and 2002, Firth et al.
(2006) argued that firms having foreign investors or SOEs as their largest
shareholders tended to relate CEO pay to accounting performance, whereas firms with
10

private controlling shareholders tended to relate CEO pay to the performance of the
stock market. In contrast, by using a sample of China’s listed firms between 1999 and
2005, Wang and Xiao (2011) provided evidence that controlling shareholders may
have less incentive to strengthen the pay-performance relationship due to the private
benefits they obtain from the listed firms. However, these studies only focused on
who the controlling shareholder (i.e. owner type) was and their effect on the
pay-performance relationship, they did not explain the channel through which these
effects were exercised.
In this paper we fill the gap by using samples of China’s listed firms between
2002 and 2007 to examine how and why the disproportional shareholder ownership
structure affects the pay-performance relationship.

3. Data and methodology
3.1. Sample
We compile data from firms listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen
Stock Exchange between 2002 and 2007 because information on cash flow rights and
control rights has only been available since 2002. We obtain firm characteristics from
the Chinese Stock Market Accounting Research (CSMAR) database and the data on
managerial compensation, board, and ownership structure from the SinoFin database.
Both databases have been used in past studies of Chinese listed firms (e.g., Kato and
Long, 2005; Firth et al., 2006, 2007). Similar to prior studies, we delete the ST and
*ST5 companies from our population. We also excluded firms in the finance industry
because of their unique accounting standards and incomplete information on the main
variables used in our analysis. Our final sample consists of 1,129 firms and 6,297
firm-year observations between 2002 and 2007.

5

ST stands for Special Treatment, refers to the listed firms that have already got negative net profits for two
consecutive years. *ST refers to the listed firms that have already got negative net profits for three consecutive
years and have the probability of being delisted from the stock exchanges.
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3.2. Variable definitions
3.2.1 Managerial compensation
Since 1998, Chinese listed firms have disclosed information on managerial
compensation in their annual reports. Prior to 2005, firms only reported the aggregate
compensation of their top three executives’ the sum of salary, bonus and other cash
compensation. We follow Kato and Long (2005) and use the log of the average top
three executives’ compensation as the proxy for managerial compensation. Although
some firms started to use other forms of incentive compensation after 2006, such as
stock options and restricted stock, the number of these firms account for less than 5%
of the total listed firms. Because of data limitations for other forms of incentive
compensation, we use cash and bonus compensation in this study.

3.2.2 Firm performance
We measure firm performance by using both accounting-based and market based
performance. We also use return on sales (ROS) to do robustness tests in addition to
the return on assets (ROA) and annual stock return (RET), which is consistent with
previous studies. For our analysis, we adopt industry adjusted measures of ROA, ROS,
and RET, which are calculated as the difference between the firm specific and
industry-median value of performance measure. We also repeat our analysis using
Tobin’s Q (Q), measured as the ratio of market value to firm replacement value, as an
additional measure of performance for robustness tests. We follow Merhebi et al.
(2006) and Firth et al. (2007) and employ lagged values of these variables in the
regressions because CEO pay responds to a firm’s previous performance.

3.2.3 Ownership type, cash flow rights and control rights
To examine the effects of ultimate shareholder ownership, we first identify the
ultimate controlling shareholder by tracing the chain of ownership. We classify
controlling ownership into three categories: SAMBs, SOEs and private ownership.
We then define control rights as the weakest link in the chain and cash flow rights as
the product of ownership stakes along the chain, which is consistent with previous
studies (La Porta et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2002). For example, firm A, the
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ultimate controlling shareholder, owns 70% of the shares in listed firm B, which in
turn owns 35% of the shares in listed firm C. We then decide that firm A controls 35%
of firm C, B’s ownership being weakest link in the chain, while the cash flow right is
24.5%, being the product of 70% and 35% (70%*35%). Through a pyramid structure,
cross-shareholding, and dual-class stocks, the largest shareholder’s control rights were
always in excess of their cash flow rights (La Porta et al., 1999). Therefore, in further
tests, we replace cash flow rights with excess control rights, defined as the difference
between control rights and cash flow rights, to support our main hypotheses. To
determine effective control at any intermediate as well as ultimate level, we follow
Claessens et al. (2002) and employ a cutoff level of 10% in our analysis.
Table 1 lists the definitions of all variables we use in our analysis, including the
control variables, which we take mainly from Firth et al. (2007) and Chen et al.
(2009).
(inset Table 1 here)

3.3. Sample statistics
Table 2 lists a summary statistics of variables for the full sample. Panels A and B
present descriptive statistics on managerial compensation and firm characteristics, the
latter covers the measures of firm performance, firm characteristics and the
information on cash flow rights and excess control rights. Panel C provides summary
statistics on CEO and board characteristics. Panels D, E and F report detailed statistics
for managerial compensation based on years, industries, and dominant shareholders.
Panel A shows that the mean (median) of CEO pay is 219,939 (160,000) RMB, which
is equivalent to approximately 31,420 (22,860) USD. These pay levels were much
lower than those reported in research for the U.S., U.K., and other countries (Brick et
al., 2006; Merhebi et al., 2006; Kato et al., 2007; Basu et al., 2007). This pay level
gap between China and other countries may be attributable to smaller firms, higher
rates of CEO turnover, and/or lack of long term incentives (Firth et al., 2002; Kato
and Long, 2005). Nevertheless, the means (medians) in Panel D indicate a steady
151.7% (164.8%) increase in CEO pay across our sample period, ranging from
13

131,023(95,666) RMB in 2002 to 329,811 (253,333) RMB in 2007. Panel B shows
that the average cash flow rights is 34.4% while the excess control rights is 6.4%,
indicating a clear divergence between the largest shareholder’s control rights and its
cash flow rights in these listed Chinese firms.
As shown in Panel E and F, CEO pay varies across industries and firms according
to the different categories of dominant shareholder. For example, the mean (median)
of CEO pay in the commercial industry was 236,011 (178,683) RMB, whereas the
mean (median) of CEO pay in the property industry was 339,343 (230,000) RMB.
Likewise, the mean (median) for SAMB controlled firms was 177,740 (129,333)
RMB, whereas the mean (median) for SOE controlled firms was 241,229 (190,400)
RMB.
(Inset Table 2 here)

4. Empirical results
In this section we examine the impact of ownership structure on CEO pay and the
pay-performance relationship in Chinese listed firms. We first examine how CEO pay
varies across different ownership structure and then explore how cash flow rights and
excess control rights related to CEO pay and pay-performance relationships.

4.1 Ownership structure and CEO pay
To provide some preliminary results regarding how CEO pay is related to owner
type, Table 3 reports the significance of differences in means and medians of CEO
pay between the groups. For example, the t-statistic (z-statistic) of -6.52 (-9.34) in the
comparison of SAMB versus SOE shows that the mean (median) CEO pay was
significantly higher for SOE controlled firms than SAMB controlled firms does.
These results can be further summarized as follows: the negative t-statistics in the
comparisons of SAMB versus all the other owner categories indicate that CEOs in
SAMB controlled firms received lower payments, while the positive t-statistics in the
comparisons of SOE versus all the other owner types suggest that CEOs in SOE
controlled firms received the highest payment among all categories of listed firms.
14

(Inset Table 3 here)

4.2. Cash flow rights and pay-performance relationship
To test our hypotheses regarding the relationship between managerial
compensation and firm performance, we examine the impact of ownership structure
on the pay-performance relationships. Our method is similar to those employed by
Core et al. (1999), Firth et al. (2006, 2007) and Canarella and Nourayi (2008) to test
the effects of firm performance and corporate governance variables on managerial
compensation. Before we run regressions, we also tested the Pearson correlations
between each pair of variables (contemporaneous value) in our regressions and found
they are lower, which indicates that multi-collinearity does not exist. To save space,
we did not report these results here.
In order to control for endogeneity of performance measures, we estimate
regressions relating to the equations employed in this study using 2SLS. In the first
stage we use an OLS model to obtain the fitted values of firm performance by
regressing it on a set of lagged control variables in Equation (1). In the second stage
we then estimate the following regression model in Equation (1) of CEO pay6:

ˆ
ˆ
PAYit = α 0 + α1CASHit + α 2 PERF
it −1 + α 3CASH it * PERFit −1 + α 4 SIZEit
+ α5 BOARDit + α6 INDEPit + α 7 LEVit + α8 DUALITYit + α9TENUREit

(1)

+ α10 FORit + Industry + Year + ε it
where i and t represent the firm and year, and ε is the error terms related to
unobservable features that explain cross sectional variations in CEO pay. PAY is the
level of managerial compensation measured by the log of the average top three
executive compensation levels. CASH is the cash flow rights of the controlling
shareholders. In the additional tests we replace cash flow rights with excess control
rights (EXCESS), defined as the difference between the control rights and cash flow
rights of the controlling shareholders, to provide some supplementary evidence.
ˆ is the fitted value of the firm performance variable obtained in the first stage
PERF

regression. We proxy firm performance with four measures, namely the return on
6

Results based on OLS estimation are generally similar to 2SLS estimations.
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assets (ROA), return on sales (ROS), annual stock return (RET) and Tobin’s Q (Q),
and then regress these fitted variables in separate equations. SIZE is the log of the
total firm assets, BOARD is the log of the total number of directors on the board,
INIDEP is the proportion of independent directors, and LEV is the ratio of total debts
to total assets. DUALITY is a dummy variable coded 1 if the CEO is also the board
chairman and 0 otherwise, and TENURE is the log of the CEO’s tenure with the firm
as CEO. We also include dummy variables to control for industry and year effects.
As shown in Table 4, which presents the results for Equation (1) broken out by
different firm performance measures, the lagged industry-adjusted ROA, ROS, RET
and Tobin’s Q are positively and significantly associated with CEO pay. This result
suggests that top executives tend to be paid more in firms that perform well in the
market, or have higher corporate value. For example, the coefficient on industry
adjusted ROA indicates that one unit increase in industry adjusted ROA lead to a
1.37% increase in CEO pay level (column 1). In addition, we find a positive effect of
stock return on pay. This differs from the earlier findings by Firth et al. (2007) who
depended on much earlier sample period and found that market performance did not
provide an incentive to CEOs7. We also find a positive and significant effect of
Tobin’s Q. These new findings of the positive incentive effect of market-based
performance on CEO pay is largely due to the fact that Chinese listed firms have
become more market oriented in the recent years.
The negative coefficients of CASH (see Table 4) provide evidence that CEO pay
is lower in firms where the largest shareholders have higher cash flow rights, and the
coefficients are significant. Moreover, all the interaction terms used to test whether
ownership is associated with performance based pay for CEOs are positive and
significant. This finding provides evidence in support of Hypotheses 1 that cash flow
rights have a positive incentive effect on the pay-performance relationship.
In line with previous studies (Conyon, 1997; Hermalin and Wallace, 2001; Girma
et al., 2007), our results also show that larger firms paid their managers higher salaries,
7

Using a sample of China’s listed firms from 1998 to 2000, Firth et al. (2007) find no relationship between CEO
pay and market performance.
16

and with Basu et al.’s (2007) finding of a significantly negative effect of firm leverage,
managerial compensation is negatively related to leverage, that is, firms with higher
debt pay their managers less. This latter effect may be attributable to debt being seen
as monitoring by external debt holders (John and John, 1993).
(Inset Table 4 here)

Variables such as the size of a board and number of independent directors have a
positive impact on managerial compensation. This interesting result contrasts directly
with Conyon and Peck (1998) and Firth et al. (2007), who found a negative effect of
the size of a board and an insignificant effect of the proportion of independent
directors. Our results, however, are consistent with the evidence that small boards are
more effective (Yermack, 1996) and large boards have a more doubtful influence on
CEOs (Jensen, 1993). It also suggests that the proportion of independent directors is
coming into line with the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission’s (CSRC)
mandate that at least one third of board directors, who set CEO pay, should be
independent.
We also find positive relationship between duality and CEO pay, which is
similar to Core et al.’s (1999) findings that duality in U.S firms lead to higher CEO
pay, but contrary Conyon’s (1997) analysis of British firms. We do note a positive
relationship between CEO tenure and CEO pay, which is not only consistent with
most previous studies (Brick et al., 2006; Cornett et al., 2008) but echoes the intuitive
assumption of a relationship between CEO pay and years of experience (Palia, 2001).
Interestingly, in line with our conjecture, we also find that CEOs receive higher
payment if a firm has foreign investors.

4.3 Cash flow rights and pay-performance relationship between state and
non-state controlled firms
We modify our first equation by dividing the ownership of the largest shareholder
between state ownership and private investors. Our second equation is shown as
follow:
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ˆ
ˆ
PAYit = α 0 + α1CASHit + α 2 PERF
it −1 + α 3 PSTATEit * PERFit −1 + α 4 SIZEit
+ α5 BOARDit + α6 INDEPit + α 7 LEVit + α8 DUALITYit + α9TENUREit

(2)

+ α10 FORit + Industry + Year + ε it
where PSTATE is the cash flow rights of state controlled firms. All other variables in
the second equation are defined the same as the first equation.
Table 5 reports the regression results for Equation (2) with a primary focus on the
ownership coefficients and interaction terms. A close examination of the interaction
terms also reveals some interesting outcomes. They are positive when we use
profitability to measure performance but are negative when performance is measured
as stock return and firm value. This result shows that SOE controlled firms put great
emphasis on profitability while privately controlled firms care more about market
performance. In fact, during the period of this study, SOE controlled firms achieved a
higher average growth in operating sales, which supports Hypotheses 2a. This result
differs from Kato and Long (2005) who found that state ownership weakens the
pay-performance relationship. While they examined the relationship between the CEO
pay and performance, we mainly focus on the effect that cash flow rights have on the
pay-performance relationship. We find that for the state controlled firms, cash flow
rights have positive effect on accounting based the pay-performance relationship,
while no such effect on market based the pay-performance relationship. Therefore,
our results suggest that the effect of cash flow rights on the pay-performance
relationship between state controlled firms and privately controlled firms depends on
different performance based pay schemes.
However, the coefficients are only significant for both CASH*ROAt-1 and
CASH*ROSt-1, and insignificant for other terms, so we divide state ownership into
two types of firms where the ultimate controlling shareholder is SAMB and SOE,
respectively, and run the regression relating to Equation (3) in the following section.
(Inset Table 5 here)
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4.4 Cash flow rights and pay-performance relationship across owner
types
We extend our second equation by dividing state ownership into the two types
discussed in previous section: SAMBs and SOEs. The equation is as follow:
ˆ
ˆ
PAYit = α 0 + α1CASH it + α 2 PERF
it −1 + α 3 PSAMBit * PERFit −1
ˆ
ˆ
+ α PSOE * PERF
+ α PPRI * PERF
+ α SIZE
4

it

it −1

6

it

it −1

7

it

(3)

+ α 8 BOARDit + α 9 INDEPit + α10 LEVit + α11 DUALITYit
+ α12TENUREit + α13 FORit + Industry + Year + ε it
where PSAMB (PSOE, PPRI) is the cash flow rights of different types of shareholders
if that shareholder is the controlling shareholder.
The estimation results of Equation (3) are given in Table 6, where we apply the
controlling shareholder cash flow rights to measure the ownership structure. Table 6
reports generally negative coefficients on cash flow rights regardless of performance
measures which indicate that cash flow rights will reduce the level of CEO pay.
More importantly, we focus on the interaction terms. These terms are positive when
firm performance is measured by ROA and ROS and are statistically significant for
SOE controlled firms. The results indicate that in SOE controlled firms CEO pay is
related to profitability and the cash flow rights enhance the pay-performance
relationship, which is consistent with our hypothesis 3a. The coefficients are
economically significant. For example, in column 1 of Table 6, the coefficient of
PSOE*ROAt-1 indicates that in SOE controlled firms a 1% increase cash flow rights
lead to a 8.8% increase in pay-performance sensitivity. The interaction terms with
stock return measures of performance are positive and only significant when firms
have private investors as the controlling shareholders. This result is consistent with
our hypothesis 2a that a private controller is more likely to relate CEO pay to market
performance, and again we find evidence that cash flow rights have positive incentive
effects on corporate governance. However, the results of the interaction terms
between SAMB and firm performance are insignificant, which is consistent with our
hypotheses 4. When firms have SAMB as the largest shareholder, there does not
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appear to adopt performance based pay schemes. The estimated coefficients on
control variables are similar with those reported in Table 4 and 5. Overall, our results
support the conjecture made by Firth et al. (2006) who believed that the stronger cash
flow rights of SOEs and private investors (vis-à-vis the SAMB) induce such
controlling shareholders to align CEO pay to performance whereas a controlling
SAMB shareholder does not. We provide evidence that cash flow rights have positive
effect on accounting based the pay-performance relationship when the controlling
shareholders are SOEs due to the fact that their shares are not tradable. We also find
that cash flow rights have positive effect on market based pay-performance
relationship for firms whose controlling shareholder is a private investor.
(Insert Table 6 here)

4.5 Excess control rights and pay-performance relationships
In order to provide some supplementary evidence and disentangle the incentive
and entrenchment effects of the largest shareholder, we repeat our analyses of
regression relating the Equations (1) to (3) by replacing cash flow rights (CASH) with
ultimate controlling shareholder excess control rights (EXCESS). The results are
shown in Table 7 to 9. Our primary focus is on the interaction terms between
ownership and performance. The general results show negative coefficients for most
interaction terms which supports Hypotheses 1b, 2b, and 3b, that deviation between
control rights and cash flow rights has negative entrenchment effects on corporate
governance, which is reflected by a weaker the pay-performance relationship. We
obtain opposite results when excess control rights are used instead of cash flow rights.
These results are broadly consistent with previous studies on the separation of
ownership and control (La Porta et al., 1999; Cleassens et al., 2002). Meanwhile, we
find there is a positive relationship between CEO pay and excess control rights, which
is consistent with the argument that it is easier for a CEO to expropriate wealth where
corporate governance is weak, reflected by a higher divergence between control rights
and cash flow rights (Core et al., 1999; Claessens et al., 2002).
(Inset Table 7, Table 8 and Table 9 here)
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We repeat the analyses by winsorizing the top and bottom 1% of the CEO pay
variable to excluding any influence from the outliers, and the results are broadly
consistent with those shown in the previous tables. All firm performance coefficients
are positive and significant. More important, the interaction terms between cash flow
rights and firm performance are all positive and PSOE*ROAt-1, PSOE*ROSt-1 and
PPRI*RETt-1 are statistically significant.

5. Conclusion
China’s ongoing economic reform and corporate restructuring, which focuses
primarily on improving management, is accelerating the corporatization of traditional
SOEs. CEO and top manager’s incentives, being the central theme in such reform and
great concern of largest shareholders, are poorly understood. We therefore take
advantage of the mandate since 2002 that listed firms in China have to disclose the
largest shareholder cash flow rights and control rights in their annual reports to
examine the effects on the relationship between managerial compensation and firm
performance.
Our empirical results show that cash flow rights in the hands of the ultimate
controlling shareholder have a positive effect on the pay-performance relationship. In
particular, the higher cash flow rights can better align CEO pay with firm profitability
in SOE controlled firms, and stock return in privately controlled firms. We also
provide similar evidence to Claessens et al. (2002) that divergence between control
rights and cash flow rights have a negative effect on the pay-performance relationship.
These observations suggest that the development of a market economy in China has
important implications for CEO pay.
In the Chinese context, we examine the pay-performance relationship in firms
where different types of controlling owners have dissimilar objectives and
motivations. Our multivariate analysis results show that the pay-performance scheme
has been relevant in SOE and privately controlled firms, albeit depending on different
performance measures. In SOE controlled firms, CEO pay is linked to firm
accounting performance (ROA and ROS) but not sensitive to market based firm
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performance. This is consistent with controlling state owners whose shares are
non-tradable but who are entitled to cash flows. This is also consistent with the
private benefits of controlling shareholders because the CEO pay scheme is to
maximize accounting performance in order to extract greater cash flows. In privately
controlled firms, however, CEO pay is sensitive to market performance, which is
consistent with literature on US firms.
Overall, our study results suggest that ownership structure and types of controlling
shareholders have jointly affected the CEO pay-performance relationship in China.
Therefore, to better understand the causes and consequences of CEO compensation,
future studies should focus on the unique characteristics of the institutional
environment, such as corporate governance and ownership structure.
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Tables:
Table 1
Variable Definitions.
Variables

Definition

Compensation
Managerial compensation (PAY)

Log of the average top three executives’ compensation

Firm performance and characteristics
Return on assets (ROA)
Return on sales (ROS)
Stock return (RET)
Tobin’s Q (Q)
Firm size (SIZE)
Leverage (LEV)
Foreign investor (FOR)

Net income / total assets
Net income/sales
Annual stock return
Market value/replacement value a
Log of total assets
Total debts/total assets in book value
Equal to 1 if the firm has foreign investors

Ownership structure
Cash flow rights (CASH)
Excess control rights (EXCESS)
PSTATE
PSAMB
PSOE
PPRI

Cash flow rights held by the ultimate controlling
shareholder
Difference between the control rights and cash flow
rights
Cash flow rights of state controlled firms
Cash flow rights of SAMB controlled firms
Cash flow rights of SOE controlled firms
Cash flow rights of privately controlled firms

CEO and board characteristics
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CEO-chair duality (DUALITY)
CEO tenure (TENURE)
Board size (BOARD)
Board composition (INDEP)

Equal to 1 if the CEO is also the chairman of the board
Log of years the CEO has been this position
Log of total directors on board
Independent directors/total directors

Other variables
Industry (Industry) b
Year (Year)

Equal to 1 for the specific industry
Equal to 1 for the specific year

a

Market value is measured as the sum of the market value of equity and the book value of debt;

replacement value is measured using the book value of total assets.
b

We create four dummy variables to represent the five groups of listed firms borrowed from Firth et al.

(2006): industrial, commercial, public utility, property, and conglomerate (all other industries).

Table 2
Descriptive Statistics.
Variables

Mean

Median

Min

Max

Std. Dev.

160,000

6,666

470,6667

75,649

2.64
0.039
-3.96
0.96
1770
50.25
32.17
0

-168.26
-83.69
-90.93
0.13
27.3
0.02
0.51
0

46.31
46.63
1611.78
23.44
719000
1037.51
100
70.56

8.49
1.87
104.68
0.76
17600
25.87
18.11
9.06

Panel C: CEO characteristics and board characteristics
CEO duality (DUALITY)
0.11
0
CEO tenure (TENURE)
2.55
2
Board size (BOARD)
9.76
9
Board composition (INDEP)
3.13
3

0
0.08
4
0

1
12.42
23
10

0.31
1.85
2.20
0.94

Panel D: Compensation based on year
2002
131,023
2003
170,329
2004
212,776
2005
218,176
2006
253,069
2007
329,811

6,666
7,666
10,266
8,966
12,000
166,66

1,575,308
1,628,234
3,210,000
2,726,667
3,740,000
470,6667

122,442
153,738
213,192
205,604
243,939
315,655

Panel A: Managerial Compensation
CEO average pay
219,939
Panel B: Firm characteristics
Return on assets (ROA) %
Return on sales (ROS) %
Stock return (RET) %
Tobin’s Q (Q)
Assets (millions)
Capital structure (LEV) %
Cash flow rights (CASH)
a

Excess control rights(EXCESS)

2.26
-0.043
39.69
1.16
3940
49.71
34.41
6.38

95,666
126,666
160,379
167,633
196,666
253,333

Panel E: Compensation based on industry
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Industrial
Commercial
Public utility
Property
Conglomerate

202,353
236,011
245,134
339,343
231,535

Panel F: Compensation based on ownership
SAMB
177,740
SOE
241,229
PRIVATE
211,333

140,333
178,683
202,383
230,000
185,870

7,200
13,666
11,424
12,566
6,666

3,486,567
1,309,300
1,848,030
4,706,667
1,707,057

209,495
203,546
204,141
485,295
194,260

129,333
190,400
146,966

9,246
7,200
6,666

1,225,333
4,706,667
1,792,933

160,800
212,011
210,226

The figures in Panel A are the average of six years from 2002 to 2007.
The figures for all the value variables are in China’s currency, RMB.
a

Excess control is defined as the difference between the control rights and cash flow rights of the
ultimate controlling shareholder, which is consistent with Claessens et al. (2002). This information is
only available in the listed firms’ annual reports since 2002.

Table 3
Test of Differences of CEO Pay across Ownerships.
SAMB vs. SOE
a

-6.52***
b
-9.34***

SAMB vs. PRIVATE

SOE vs. PRIVATE

a

a

-3.82***
b
-3.81***

4.86***
b
-7.17***

*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
a
b

t-value from the t-test of differences in means.
z-value from the Mann-Whitney U-test of differences in medians.

Table 4
Regression Results of Cash Flow Rights Effects on CEO Pay.
Dependent variable: managerial compensation
Constant
CASH
ROAt-1
ROSt-1
RETt-1
Qt-1
CASH*ROAt-1
CASH*ROSt-1
CASH*RETt-1
CASH*Qt-1
SIZE
BOARD
INDEP
LEV

6.098***(17.10)
-0.006**(-2.32)
1.369***(3.79)

5.450***(16.83)
-0.007***(-2.71)

7.388***(16.94)
-0.013***(-2.74)

5.022***(16.10)
-0.008***(-2.05)

0.053**(2.04)
0.175***(6.36)
0.259**(2.07)
0.169*(1.94)
0.052**(2.03)
0.051***(4.38)
0.246***(13.97)
0.198***(3.68)
0.763***(4.61)
0.091(1.36)

0.274***(18.18)
0.187***(3.50)
0.760***(4.55)
0.077(1.24)

0.190***(10.41)
0.241***(4.44)
0.441**(2.43)
-0.081*(-1.70)

0.012*(1.69)
0.297***(19.07)
0.185***(3.57)
0.758***(4.45)
-0.144***(-3.06)
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DUALITY
TENURE
FOR
Industry
Year
Adjusted R2
Obs

0.098***(2.81)
0.077***(6.25)
0.377***(9.66)
Included
Included
0.2012
3286

0.091**(2.57)
0.086***(7.24)
0.364***(9.07)
Included
Included
0.1829
3286

0.089**(2.22)
0.068***(4.47)
0.428***(9.99)
Included
Included
0.1215
3286

0.081**(2.44)
0.095***(7.40)
0.349***(8.72)
Included
Included
0.1775
3286

Dependent variable is managerial compensation. Four firm performance variables, ROA, ROS, RET
and Q, are the industry-adjusted firm performance measures. These performance variables are actually
fitted values and obtained by regressing them on a set of lagged control variables in their first stage
regression respectively. CASH is the cash flow rights of the ultimate controlling shareholder. SIZE,
BOARD, INDEP, LEV, TENURE, DUALITY and FOR are measured as in Table 1.
The t-statistics, computed using the White (1980) heteroskedasticity robust standard error, are given in
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Table 5
Regression Results of Cash Flow Rights of State and Non-state Controlled Firms.
Dependent variable: managerial compensation
Constant
CASH
ROAt-1
ROSt-1
RETt-1
Qt-1
PSTATE*ROAt-1
PSTATE*ROSt-1
PSTATE*RETt-1
PSTATE*Qt-1
SIZE
BOARD
INDEP
LEV
DUALITY
TENURE
FOR
Industry
Year
Adjust R2
Obs

6.375***(15.51)
-0.007***(-8.73)
4.689***(4.25)

7.292***(11.90)
-0.007***(-7.90)

5.957***(14.89)
-0.005***(-6.02)

5.015***(16.23)
-0.005***(-5.77)

3.049***(4.26)
0.424***(3.32)
0.384**(2.26)
0.073*(1.83)
0.112***(3.82)
-0.004(-1.17)
0.236***(11.63)
0.226***(3.75)
0.582***(2.96)
0.145*(1.69)
0.082**(2.05)
0.061***(4.38)
0.385***(8.45)
Included
Included
0.2326
3286

0.185***(5.82)
0.190***(2.74)
0.759***(3.27)
0.577***(3.14)
0.089*(1.93)
0.058***(3.64)
0.445***(7.86)
Included
Included
0.2203
3286

0.262***(13.53)
0.233***(3.60)
0.484**(2.31)
-0.144***(-2.78)
0.064(1.48)
0.073***(5.23)
0.381***(7.89)
Included
Included
0.2165
3286

-0.002(-0.03)
0.315***(21.86)
0.215***(3.55)
0.419**(2.10)
-0.226***(-4.53)
0.060(1.51)
0.075***(5.68)
0.345***(7.68)
Included
Included
0.2321
3286

Dependent variable is managerial compensation. Four firm performance variables, ROA, ROS, RET
and Q, are the industry-adjusted firm performance measures. These performance variables are actually
fitted values and obtained by regressing them on a set of lagged control variables in their first stage
regression respectively. CASH is the cash flow rights of the ultimate controlling shareholder.
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PSTATE represents the cash flow rights of state controlled firms. All other variables are defined
the same as those in previous tables.
The t-statistics in parentheses are computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard
error. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Table 6
Regression Results of Cash Flow Rights across Three Types of Firms.
Dependent variable: managerial compensation
Constant
CASH
ROAt-1
ROSt-1
RETt-1
Qt-1
PSAMB*ROAt-1
PSOE*ROAt-1
PPRI*ROAt-1
PSAMB*ROSt-1
PSOE*ROSt-1
PPRI*ROSt-1
PSAMB*RETt-1
PSOE*RETt-1
PPRI*RETt-1
PSAMB*Qt-1
PSOE*Qt-1
PPRI*Qt-1
SIZE
BOARD
INDEP
LEV
DUALITY
TENURE
FOR
Industry
Year
Adjusted R2
Obs

6.382***(17.69)
-0.006***(-7.19)
8.306***(2.75)

5.678***(16.70)
-0.006***(-8.10)

5.752***(15.85)
-0.005***(-4.93)

5.027***(16.12)
-0.006**(-2.13)

0.756(1.23)
0.549(1.45)
0.718*(1.76)
0.130(1.57)
0.088**(2.49)
0.207(1.28)
0.012(0.56)
0.003**(2.32)
0.019(0.73)
0.006(0.78)
0.006(0.78)
0.007*(1.76)

0.234***(13.20)
0.215***(3.49)
0.589***(2.94)
0.232**(2.08)
0.076*(1.89)
0.057***(4.03)
0.377***(8.26)
Included
Included
0.2041
3286

0.274***(16.86)
0.206***(3.36)
0.552***(2.79)
0.023(0.21)
0.070*(1.74)
0.075***(5.47)
0.365***(8.06)
Included
Included
0.2173
3286

0.270***(15.35)
0.228***(3.52)
0.476**(2.25)
-0.141**(-2.50)
0.053(1.24)
0.073***(5.09)
0.377***(7.78)
Included
Included
0.2160
3286

0.001(0.04)
0.005**(2.25)
0.010**(2.33)
0.316***(21.53)
0.226***(3.61)
0.362*(1.80)
-0.238**(-2.27)
0.061(1.50)
0.075***(5.64)
0.345***(7.62)
Included
Included
0.2293
3286

Dependent variable is managerial compensation. Four firm performance variables, ROA, ROS, RET
and Q, are the industry-adjusted firm performance measures. These performance variables are actually
fitted values and obtained by regressing them on a set of lagged control variables in their first stage
regression respectively. PSAMB (PSOE, PPRI) represents the cash flow rights of each type of
controlling shareholder. All the other variables are defined the same as those in previous tables.
The t-statistics in parentheses are computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard
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error. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Table 7
Regression Results of Excess Control Rights Effects on CEO Pay.
Dependent variable: managerial compensation
Constant
EXCESS
ROAt-1
ROSt-1
RETt-1
Qt-1
EXCESS*ROAt-1
EXCESS*ROSt-1
EXCESS*RETt-1
EXCESS*Qt-1
SIZE
BOARD
INDEP
LEV
DUALITY
TENURE
FOR
Industry
Year
Adjusted R2
Obs

6.222***(15.82)
0.003**(2.14)
3.397***(2.72)

6.867***(13.16)
0.004**(2.42)

6.090***(15.18)
0.004**(2.44)

5.203***(17.16)
0.002(0.60)

2.746***(3.70)
0.480***(2.95)
0.462**(2.32)
-0.049(-0.75)
-0.135***(-3.27)
-0.016*(-1.82)
0.228***(11.52)
0.263***(4.27)
0.653***(3.31)
0.086(1.09)
0.108***(2.62)
0.071***(5.15)
0.392***(8.57)
Included
Included
0.2225
3286

0.186***(6.55)
0.300***(4.32)
0.680***(3.11)
0.423***(2.70)
0.135***(2.92)
0.701***(4.58)
0.415***(8.04)
Included
Included
0.2137
3286

0.242***(13.03)
0.249***(3.86)
0.576***(2.74)
-0.124**(-2.44)
0.084*(1.95)
0.079***(5.68)
0.400***(8.21)
Included
Included
0.2081
3286

-0.007(-0.78)
0.294***(21.15)
0.242***(4.00)
0.477**(2.35)
-0.202***(-4.00)
0.080**(2.00)
0.080***(5.95)
0.363***(8.05)
Included
Included
0.2252
3286

Dependent variable is managerial compensation. Four firm performance variables, ROA, ROS, RET
and Q, are the industry-adjusted firm performance measures. These performance variables are actually
fitted values and obtained by regressing them on a set of lagged control variables in their first stage
regression respectively. EXCESS is the excess control rights of the ultimate controlling shareholder.
SIZE, BOARD, INDEP, LEV, TENURE, DUALITY and FOR are measured as in Table 1.
The t-statistics, computed using the White (1980) heteroskedasticity robust standard error, are given in
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Table 8
Regression Results of Excess Control Rights of State and Non-state Controlled Firms.
Dependent variable: managerial compensation
Constant
EXCESS
ROAt-1
ROSt-1
RETt-1
Qt-1

6.249***(15.59)
0.003**(2.01)
3.311***(3.35)

6.379***(14.23)
0.003**(2.21)

6.097***(15.16)
0.003**(2.29)

5.156***(16.83)
0.003*(1.65)

1.645***(3.39)
0.433***(3.16)
0.459***(2.79)
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PSTATE*ROAt-1
PSTATE*ROSt-1
PSTATE*RETt-1
PSTATE*Qt-1
SIZE
BOARD
INDEP
LEV
DUALITY
TENURE
FOR
Industry
Year
Adjust R2
Obs

0.060(1.08)
0.102***(3.10)
0.013*(1.77)
0.228***(11.55)
0.259***(4.26)
0.659***(3.34)
0.081(1.06)
0.106***(2.62)
0.071***(5.12)
0.395***(8.57)
Included
Included
0.2225
3286

0.218***(9.47)
0.260***(4.10)
0.759***(3.61)
0.160(1.50)
0.115***(2.70)
0.076***(5.37)
0.419***(8.36)
Included
Included
0.1543
3286

0.242***(12.90)
0.252***(3.90)
0.588***(2.80)
-0.126**(-2.51)
0.082*(1.91)
0.078***(5.51)
0.399***(8.21)
Included
Included
0.2095
3286

0.005(0.82)
0.295***(20.72)
0.244***(4.03)
0.474**(2.35)
-0.206***(-4.04)
0.078**(1.96)
0.079***(5.91)
0.363***(8.05)
Included
Included
0.2246
3286

Dependent variable is managerial compensation. Four firm performance variables, ROA, ROS, RET
and Q, are the industry-adjusted firm performance measures. These performance variables are actually
fitted values and obtained by regressing them on a set of lagged control variables in their first stage
regression respectively. EXCESS is the excess control rights of the ultimate controlling shareholder.

PSAMB (PSOE, PPRI) represents the excess control rights of each type of controlling shareholder.
All other variables are defined the same as those in previous tables.
The t-statistics in parentheses are computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard
error. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.

Table 9
Regression Results of Excess Control Rights across Three Types of Firms.
Dependent variable: managerial compensation
Constant
EXCESS
ROAt-1
ROSt-1
RETt-1
Qt-1
PSAMB*ROAt-1
PSOE*ROAt-1
PPRI*ROAt-1
PSAMB*ROSt-1
PSOE*ROSt-1
PPRI*ROSt-1
PSAMB*RETt-1
PSOE*RETt-1
PPRI*RETt-1
PSAMB*Qt-1
PSOE*Qt-1

6.216***(15.81)
0.003**(2.07)
3.362***(2.69)

6.399***(14.15)
0.003**(2.28)

6.092***(15.20)
0.004**(2.45)

5.245***(17.23)
0.002**(2.47)

1.949***(3.13)
0.482***(2.95)
0.478**(2.33)
-0.060(-0.62)
-0.028(-0.40)
-0.064(-0.93)
-0.076(-1.52)
-0.052(-1.49)
-0.123***(-2.91)
-0.012(-0.65)
-0.017(-1.56)
-0.016*(-1.80)
-0.043(-1.07)
-0.012**(-2.10)
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PPRI*Qt-1
SIZE
BOARD
INDEP
LEV
DUALITY
TENURE
FOR
Industry
Year
Adjusted R2
Obs

0.229***(11.55)
0.262***(4.25)
0.653***(3.31)
0.078(0.98)
0.107***(2.61)
0.071***(5.15)
0.392***(8.55)
Included
Included
0.2227
3286

0.215***(8.92)
0.281***(4.29)
0.705***(3.39)
0.200*(1.66)
0.123***(2.84)
0.075***(5.24)
0.404***(8.26)
Included
Included
0.1434
3286

0.242***(13.03)
0.249***(3.86)
0.576***(2.74)
-0.123**(-2.42)
0.084*(1.95)
0.079***(5.68)
0.401***(8.21)
Included
Included
0.2080
3286

-0.007*(-1.79)
0.293***(21.12)
0.243***(4.02)
0.436**(2.14)
-0.198***(-3.96)
0.085**(2.13)
0.080***(5.96)
0.367***(8.14)
Included
Included
0.2277
3286

Dependent variable is managerial compensation. Four firm performance variables, ROA, ROS, RET
and Q, are the industry-adjusted firm performance measures. These performance variables are actually
fitted values and obtained by regressing them on a set of lagged control variables in their first stage
regression respectively. PSAMB (PSOE, PPRI) represents the excess control rights of each type of
controlling shareholder. All the other variables are defined the same as those in previous tables.
The t-statistics in parentheses are computed using the White (1980) heteroscedasticity robust standard
error. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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